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THE GARCE1TI VIRUS 
Nancy M Modesitt· 
In an era where corporate malfeasance has imposed staggering costs on 
society, ranging from the largest oil spill in recorded history to the 
largest government bailout of Wall Street, one would think that those who 
uncover corporate wrongdoing before it causes significant harm should 
receive awards. Employees are particularly well-placed to uncover such 
wrongdoing within companies. However, rather than reward these 
employees, employers tend to fire or marginalize them. While there are 
statutory protections for whistleblowers, a disturbing new trend appears 
to be developing: courts are excluding from the protection of 
whistleblowing statutes employees who report wrongdoing as part of 
their jobs. Under this doctrine, the internal safety inspector who 
uncovers illegal behavior while performing his duties and reports it to his 
boss can legally be fired for blowing the whistle. 
This Article explains how this doctrine, the job duties exclusion, was 
developed by the Federal Circuit over a decade ago to limit claims 
brought by federal employees under the federal Whistleblower Protection 
Act. Flawed at its inception, the doctrine languished, with no states 
adopting it until the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. In 
Garcetti, the Court applied the job duties exclusion to a claim brought 
under the First Amendment. Even though Garcetti involved a 
constitutional, not a statutory, claim, the decision has given new life to 
the doctrine developed by the Federal Circuit. Since Garcetti, courts 
have begun applying the job duties exclusion to state statutory 
whistleblower claims, placing protections for employees at grave risk. 
This Article examines this developing trend, explaining how Garcetti has 
had an impact on what is fUndamentally a state statutory interpretation 
issue. It identifies the flaws of the job duties exclusion as first 
articulated, the reasons why state courts should not apply it to state 
whistleblower protection statutes, and recommends that legislatures 
amend statutory protections to ensure that employees who do the right 
thing and report corporate malfeasance are protected against retaliation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, l the Supreme Court effectively discouraged 
federal and state employees from blowing the whistle on governmental 
wrongdoing by adopting a limitation on these employees' First 
Amendment rights. Specifically, the Court held that governmental 
employees are not engaged in protected speech for First Amendment 
purposes where the employees' speech is made pursuant to their official 
duties.2 Thus, when an employee is performing his job, uncovers illegal 
behavior, and reports it through the proper chain of command, his 
speech in disclosing the governmental wrongdoing is not protected by 
the First Amendment.3 
One of the justifications for the Court's decision was that government 
employees have other protections provided by a variety of state and 
federal statutes against retaliation when the employee engages in 
whistleblowing.4 Ironically, while the Garcetti Court relied upon these 
protections to justify the decision, Garcetti itself appears to be placing 
these protections at risk. Despite significant criticism in the popular 
1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
2. Id at 421. 
3. See id This Article refers to this limitation on whistleblowing protections as the '~ob duties 
exclusion." 
4. Id at 425 (noting the "powerful network of legislative enactments-such as whisteblower 
protection laws and labor codes" and citing the federal Whisteblower Protection Act as an example of 
such protections). 
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press and scholarly literature,s the ''job duties exclusion" articulated in 
Gareelli has slowly begun to spread. Employers have increasingly 
argued for its application to state statutes protecting public and private 
sector employees, with some success. If this developing trend 
continues, it represents a significant threat to whistleblowing behavior, 
as those most likely to notice employer wrongdoing are the employees 
who see it firsthand as part of their jobs. 
This Article contains four parts. Part II traces the historical 
development of the job duties exclusion, which was created long before 
Gareelli as a limitation on federal employee whistleblowing claims 
brought under the Whistleblower Protection Act. Part III examines the 
substance and effect of the exclusion and concludes that it unjustifiably 
threatens the goals of whistleblower protection statutes. Part IV 
explores the post-Gareetti expansion of the exclusion, including the 
extent of this developing trend and why it is occurring. Part V argues 
that Congress and state legislatures should amend whistleblower 
protection statutes to eliminate the potential for the application of this 
exclusion and that judges should stop the spread of this trend by 
rejecting arguments for its application to state statutes. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOB DUTIES EXCLUSION 
At present, there are four potential sources of whistleblowing 
protection for employees: (1) common law claims for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public pOlicl,6 which are generally available 
only to private sector employees; (2) constitutional claims for 
infringement on First Amendment rights, which are available only to 
public sector (governmental) employees; 8 (3) generalized statutory 
prohibitions on retaliation against whistleblowers, which are available to 
nearly all state and federal government employees as well as some 
private sector employees;9 and (4) topic-specific statutory prohibitions 
on retaliation against whistleblowers who report wrongdoing in specific 
S. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Gan:etti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights 0/ 
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117 (2008); Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: 
Oarcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox a/Statutory Protection/or Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L 
REv. 22 (2008); Christie S. Totten, Quieting Disruption: The MIStake o/Curtailing Public Employee3' 
Free Speech under Oarcetti v. Ceballos, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 233 (2008). But see Andrew 
Bernie, A Principled Limitation on Judicial Interference: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), 
30 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 1047 (2007). 
6. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (describing claim). 
7. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) 
(noting that no common law claim for wrongful discharge exists for public sector employees). 
8. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (describing parameters of the claim). 
9. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAw OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE apps. A, B (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2010) (listing statutes). 
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statutory contexts, which vary from statute to statute as to whether they 
apply to public sector employees, private sector employees, or both.IO 
In order to understand the development of the job duties exclusion, it 
is necessary to understand the history of whistleblowing protection, 
including the development of these four modem types of whistle blowing 
protection. 
A Brief History of Whistleblower Protection 
The histo~ of whistleblowing protections in the United States is well 
documented. I This area of law developed slowly and began with 
modest efforts that did not truly protect whistleblowers at all. The False 
Claims Act (FCA), which was passed during the Civil War, created a 
bounty system for those who disclosed fraud perpetrated against the 
government. 12 At that time, the concern was focused on fraud 
perpetrated by contractors/suppliers in the war effort. As a result, the 
FCA created a bounty system whereby the reporter of the wrongdoing 
was given a share of the recovery. However, the FCA provided no 
protections to prevent retaliation against the whistleblower; if the 
whistleblower was an employee of the contractor, the contractor was 
free to fire, demote, suspend, or reprimand the employee. 13 
The next step in the development of whistleblowing protections was 
the recognition of anti-retaliation rights for employees engaging in 
union-organizing activities, which developed during the early labor 
movement.14 The Railway Labor Act, for example, passed in 1926, was 
the first act to prohibit employers from retaliating afainst employees 
who promoted, organized, or joined labor unions. I Protection for 
workers outside of the railroads came with the passage of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during the Great Depression, which 
prohibited discrimination against employees in order to encourage or 
discourage membership in a union.16 
10. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
II. See WESTMAN & MODESIlT, supra note 9; Roberta Ann Johnson, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN 
IT WORKS-AND WHY, 94-95 (2001); Wim Vandeken:khove, WHISTLEBLOWING AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL RESPONSmILITY: A GLOBAL AsSESSMENT, 164-85 (2006); Mary Kreiner 
Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 183, 191-95 (2007). 
12. See WESTMAN & MODESIlT, supra note 9, at 4. For a more detailed description of the 
history of whistleblower protections, see WESTMAN & MODEsm, supra note 9, at ch. I. 
13. See WESTMAN & MODESIlT, supra note 9, at 4. 
14. See id.; Orly Lobel, Citizenship. Organizational Citizenship. and the Laws of Overlapping 
Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REv. 433, 443 (2009) (noting 1986 amendment to the FCA to protect 
employee-whistleblowers from retaliation). 
IS. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). 
16. See 29 U.S.C. § I 58(a)(3) (2006). 
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The number of federal laws containing prohibitions on employer 
retaliation against employees has increased in the decades since the 
NLRA. Antiretaliation provisions are now found in dozens of federal 
laws, ranging from the little-known Asbestos Hazard Emergency 
Response Actl7 to the well-known protections contained in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 In addition to the increasing number of 
federal statutes protecting employees against retaliation, the scope of 
protection against retaliation by employers has become more 
encompassing over time. For instance, Title VII prohibits retaliation 
against employees who oppose employer conduct made unlawful by 
Title VII or participate in any Title VII investigation or proceeding.19 
Courts have construed these provisions to prohibit retaliation even 
against former employees.2o 
Part of the reason for the increase in the number and scope of 
protections for employee whistleblowers can be attributed to the 
development of greater governmental oversight and regulation of 
corporations and industry.21 For instance, the early environmental 
protection movement and the civil rights movement spawned legislation 
regulating companies. The package of legislative limitations on 
corporate freedom included protections for whistleblowers.22 
All of the above statutes prohibiting retaliation are topic-specific 
statutes; that is, they provide retaliation protection only for 
whistleblowing on a particular topic, such as employers engaging in 
unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII.23 This topic-
specific approach was the first stage in the development of modem 
statutory employee whistleblower protections. As some of the topic-
specific statutory whistleblower protections were being enacted, 
legislators began developing generalized employee whistleblower 
protections as well. The development of generalized whistleblower 
protection for employees took three separate routes: (I) common law, 
(2) constitutional, and (3) statutory protections. 
Common law protections were developed by the states as an 
exception to the employment at-will regime that governs the vast 
majority of employees in the private sector.24 This common law claim, 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, is a tort-based remedy 
17. 15 u.s.C. § 2651 (2006). 
18. See WESTMAN & MODESIlT, supra note 9, at app. C (listing federal laws protecting 
employees against retaliation). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
20. Robinson v. Shell Oil, Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
21. See WESTMAN & MODESIlT, supra note 9, at 7-9. 
22. Id 
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
24. See WESTMAN & MODESIlT, supra note 9, at 16-17. 
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for employees whose employers fired them for exposing employer 
wrongdoing.25 The core concept of this claim is that while employers 
can fire employees for any or no reason, they cannot fire employees for 
reasons that would violate "public policy.,,26 In one of the earliest cases 
to apply this protection, Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, the 
California Court of Appeals held than an employee had a claim for 
wrongful discharge where he was fired for refusing to follow his 
employer's instructions to commit perjury.27 
Since that decision courts have broadened the scope of protected 
behavior.28 Today, claims generally have been recognized where 
employees have been fired for (1) refusing to violate a statute, (2) 
performing a statutory obligation, (3) exercising a statutory right or 
privilege, and (4) reporting a statutory violation. 29 
While the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim was 
not developed specifically or solely for whistleblowers, it can be a 
significant source of protection for them.30 Nearly every state 
recognizes some form of the wrongful discharge claim; however, the 
parameters of the claim vary widely, meaning that whether an 
emploree-whistleblower is protected will vary significantly from state to 
state.3 These common law protections generally apply only to private 
sector employees. 
While public sector employees generally lack access to the common 
law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, in the 
decade after the seminal Petermann case was decided, the U.S. Supreme 
Court opened the door to whistleblower retaliation claims for 
government employees under the First Amendment. In Pickering v. 
Board of Education,32 the Court held that the First Amendment could 
protect employee statements criticizing their employers if the employee 
spoke on a matter of public concern.33 In Pickering, the employee was a 
teacher who publicly spoke against the need for additional school 
funding.34 The teacher vocally expressed a belief that the school district 
25. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAw 21 (2001). 
26. Id at 23. 
27. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. ofTeamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
28. See KOHN, supra note 25, at 23. 
29. See Gannt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (discussing the generally accepted 
fonnulation of the claim); see also KOHN, supra note 25, at 23. 
30. Note that the first three claims do not involve disclosure of employer wrongdoing, which is 
the hallmark of whistleblower protection statutes. These cases focus instead on forcing employers to 
respect the law and, in particular, to respect employees' statutory rights and obligations. 
31. For a discussion of the variations among state common law claims, see WESTMAN & 
MODESITT, supra note 9, at ch. 5, app. D. 
32. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
33. Id at 568. 
34. Id. at 566-67. 
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had improperly allocated funds in the past as a reason for the funding 
opposition. While this disclosure of mishandling funds could make the 
employee a whistleblower, the school district fired the employee for 
opposing the funding, not primarily because of the disclosure of wasted 
funds, which could be seen as whistleblowing behavior. The focus of 
Pickering's claim, and many other subsequent First Amendment claims, 
was not primarily on whistleblowing but on the more feneral right of 
employees to voice disagreements with employers. 3 Thus, cases 
involving clashes of political opinions drove the initial development of 
this constitutional protection for public employees.36 
Subsequent cases clarified that a bBlancing test would be used to 
determine whether the speech could be protected. This test balanced the 
employer's legitimate interests in running the workplace effectively and 
the employee's free speech interests.37 Under the line of cases applying 
this test, state and federal employees who disclosed unlawful conduct at 
work might be protected from retaliation under the First Amendment if 
the unlawful conduct were a matter of public concern and the 
disruptions caused by the whistleblowing behavior were not too great.38 
Soon after the development of the common law and constitutional 
claims that provided some protection for some whistleblowing 
employees, legislators began to enact generalized statutory protections. 
These generalized whistleblower protection statutes were initially 
focused on government employees at both the federal and state level. 
For example, the federal government led the way by passing the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978.39 This law provided whistleblower 
protections to civil service employees who reported fraud, illegal 
conduct, or mismanagement in the federal govemment.40 The states 
then followed suit by passing whistleblower protection statutes covering 
state (and sometimes local) employees. Now nearly every state has 
enacted some type of whistleblower protection statute for state 
employees.41 These statutes vary greatly from state to state in terms of 
protected disclosures, remedies to employees, and to whom the 
disclosures can be made.42 
35. See id at 568--69. 
36. See. e.g., Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (involving an employee who was 
terminated for speaking critically of the president); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987) 
(regarding the firing of employees due to political associations). 
37. See Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Rankin, 483 U.S. 1056. 
38. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53. 
39. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95454,92 Stat 1111 (1978). 
40. Id 
41. See WESTMAN & MODEsm, supra note 9, at app. A (listing state statutes). 
42. See id.; see also State Whistleblower Law~erview, PUB. EMPs. FOR ENV1'L. 
RESPONSmlLlTY, http://www.peer.orgldocslwbp2loverview.pdf(last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (identifying 
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Legislatures have been much slower to pass generalized 
whistleblower protections for private sector employees. There is no 
federal statute providing generalized whistleblowing protections for 
employees in the private sector. At the state level, less than half of the 
states have enacted generalized whistleblower protection statutes for 
private sector employees.43 Like state statutes for .,gublic employees, 
statutes governing the private sector also vary greatly. 
Within this mix of whistleblowing protections, the job duties 
exclusion was created in one small comer: under the federal 
,. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA).45 The WPA amended the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 197846 and expanded the general 
whistleblowing protections it provided. 
B. The Whistleblower Protection Act: The Source of the Job Duties 
Exclusion 
The source of the job duties exclusion lies with the interpretations of 
the WP A. 47 Prior to the WP A, protection of whistleblowers had been 
provided as part of the general civil service laws.48 The WP A revised 
and, in general, increased the protections afforded to whistleblowers.49 
This encouraged greater protection of whistleblowers by the federal 
Office of Special Counsel-the office charged with investigating 
whistleblowing complaints. 50 
The WP A prohibits the federal government, as an employer, from 
firing, retaliating against, or threatening to retaliate against employees 
different protections afforded by state whistleblower laws). 
43. See WEsTMAN & MODESI1T, supra note 9, at 77; see also WESTMAN & MODESI1T, supra 
note 9, at 4-2 (Supp. 2010). 
44. Seeid 
45. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12,103 Stat. 16 (1989). 
46. Civil Service RefoRD Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,92 Stat 1111 (1978). 
47. It is more accurate to state that the courts are interpreting the WPA and the Civil Service 
Refonn Act of 1978 together because the WP A merely amended the Civil Service RefoRD Act. 
However, the court decisions in this area generally refer to the WP A as the source of whisteblower 
protection, perhaps as a shorthand for both statutes, a practice this Article will follow. The primary anti-
retaliation provisions of the Act are found at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302 (West 2008). 
48. Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope For 
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 355 (1991). 
49. For instance, prior to the WPA. if a federal agency could establish that it would have taken 
action against a whisteblower even if the employee had not blown the whistle, the claim was barred. 
However, the wpA revised this requirement by allowing the claim to stand so long as the 
whistleblowing was a factor in the decision, even if, on balance, the agency would have taken the action 
anyway. Id at 377-380. One scholar noted that the WPA was one more step in the ''minuet'' of 
whisteblower protections; in this dance, Congress attempts to enact greater protections, taking one step 
forward, while the federal courts circumscribe the effective scope of these protections through their 
decisions "interpreting" federal law. Id at 361. 
SO. Id at 371. 
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who engage in protected behavior.51 The WPA defines this protected 
behavior as "any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant 
which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences (1) a 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (2) gross mismanagement, a 
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety.,,52 In addition, employees are 
protected when they exercise a statutory right, testify regarding a 
protected disclosure, cooperate with or disclose information to an 
Inspector General when required by law, or refuse to obey an illegal 
order. 53 
Claims brought under the WP A are heard first by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB),54 which is the governmental entity primarily 
responsible for claims brought by federal employees who have been 
fired, demoted, or disciplined.55 An administrative judge initially 
decides these cases, which can then be appealed to the Board itself. 56 If 
the employee is dissatisfied with the Board's decision, the employee 
may elect to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which has the sole authority to decide these appeals. 57 
In 1998 the Federal Circuit heard the issue of whether an employee 
performing normal job duties was entitled to protections against 
retaliation if, in the course of performing his duties, he reported the type 
5 I. The adverse employment actions that are prohibited are: "(i) an appoinbnent; (ii) a 
promotion; (iii) an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective action; (iv) a 
detail, transfer, or reassignment; (v) a reinstatement; (vi) a restoration; (vii) a reemployment; (viii) a 
perfonnance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title; (ix) a decision conceming pay, benefits, or 
awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to 
lead to an appoinbnent, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in this 
subparagraph; (x) a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination; and (xi) any other significant 
change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions." 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(a)(2)(A) (West 2008). 
52. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2008). 
53. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(9) (West 2008). 
54. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) (2006). In a few instances, the claims follow an entirely different 
administrative procedure. If the employee is also claiming unlawful employment discrimination, a 
pendant whistleblowing claim would be heard as part of that discrimination case. There, the case is 
decided by an administrative judge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
appeals are made to the Office of Federal Operations within the EEOC. If the employee is dissatisfied 
with the administrative decision, the employee can bring suit in federal district court (generally the 
federal district court for the district where the employee is employed). The result of these different 
procedural processes is that while most WP A claims are decided by the Federal Circuit, there are still a 
few that are decided by the various federal district and circuit courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (2006). 
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (2006) (noting that appeal rights for performance-based discip1inary 
actions exist only for demotions or tenninations); 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006) (describing MSPB appellate 
procedures). Only significant disciplinary decisions-discharge, demotion, and lengthy suspension-
are heard by the MSPB. Lesser disciplinary actions such as reprimands and short suspensions are left to 
the employing agency to decide on its own. 
56. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1) (2006). While the statute provides that the MSPB may hear the case 
itself, it is routine to refer these cases to administrative judges for the initial hearing. 
57. 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (2006). 
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of wrongdoing covered by the WP A.58 In Willis v. Department of 
Agriculture, an employee in the Department of Agriculture reported to 
his supervisor his belief that some of the supervisor's actions were 
improper. Specifically, the employee had determined that a number of 
farms were not in compliance with a government soil-protection 
program. The supervisor disagreed and overruled the employee's 
decisions in six out of the seven situations at issue. The employee 
subsequently complained about the supervisor's decision and alleged 
that he was retaliated against for his complaint. 59 
The Federal Circuit determined that these complaints were not 
protected disclosures under the WP A because thel were merely typical 
disagreements between supervisor and employee.6 The court expressed 
concern that were the WP A to cover this type of situation, far too many 
typical disagreements would be the basis for a WPA claim.61 The court 
further explained its decision: 
Part of Willis's job duties ... was to review the conservation compliance 
of farms within his area. In reporting some of them as being out of 
compliance, he did no more than carry out his required everyday job 
responsibilities. This is expected of all government employees pursuant 
to the fiduciary obligation which every employee owes to his employer. 
Willis cannot be said to have risked his personal job security by merely 
performing his required duties. Determining whether or not farms were 
out of compliance was part of his job performance and in no way did it 
place Willis at personal risk for the benefit of the public good and cannot 
itself constitute a protected disclosure under the WP A. 62 
In reaching its decision that the disclosures were not protected, the 
court failed to consider the language of the statute or its legislative 
history. The court failed to discuss the fact that the statute's language 
covers "any disclosure"-language lacking any limitation on the type of 
disclosure, the individual's reason for making the disclosure, or whether 
the employee's job involves reporting wrongdoing. The only portion of 
the court's explanation that can be read as conducting statutory 
interpretation is its assertion that the goal of the WP A was to protect 
employees who risk their job security by reporting certain types of 
misconduct. 63 
The court jumped from this proposition to two conclusions without 
any support from the text of the WP A, its legislative history, or the 
58. Willis v. Dep't of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
59. Id at 1141. 
60. Id at 1143. 
61. Id 
62. Id at 1144. 
63. Seeid 
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policies underlying it. First, the court concluded that performing 
obligatory job duties does not entail risking one's job security; thus, the . 
conduct is not protected.64 However, it is quite possible that employees 
performing their normal job duties who expose wrongdoing are risking 
their job security. There are three possible reactions to exposing 
wrongdoing that such employees may face in the workplace. First, the 
employee's supervisor may affirmatively want the employee to disclose 
all wrongdoing. In this situation, the employee will not be facing 
reprisal for whistleblowing and, therefore, will have no need for 
protection. Second, the supervisor may be apathetic as to the disclosure 
of wrongdoing. Again, in this situation, the employee will have no need 
for protection against retaliation. Third, the supervisor may want 
limited or no disclosure of wrongdoing. This may be where the 
supervisor has some connection with the wrongdoing or where the 
supervisor is concerned about his or her own job security. In this 
scenario, by simply doing his job, the employee is risking his job. 
Providing protections in this third scenario is precisely the point of 
whistleblower protection statutes for employees. 
The second conclusion that the Willis court reached was that 
Congress did not intend for the WP A to cover nearly every disclosure by 
a federal employee ofa possible violation of the law.65 The court made 
this assertion without providing any support for it. 
Three years later, in 2001, the Federal Circuit was forced to revisit the 
issue decided in Willis because of confusion over its scope. In Huffman 
v. Office of Personnel Management,66 an employee worked in the Office 
of the Inspector General (DIG). He reported several different types of 
wrongdoing to his supervisor: (1) the supervisor's own alleged violation 
of law by "preselecting" employees to be hired rather than through the 
lawful, merit service process; (2) the supervisor's gross mismanagement 
and waste in the hiring of a contactor; (3) other employees' improper 
hiring practices, where employees were hired without a competitive 
hiring process in violation of the civil service laws; and (4) another 
supervisor directing applicants to falsify their applications for 
employment. 67 
The plaintiff in Huffman alleged that he was retaliated against for 
having made the complaints. On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court 
held that the WP A protected only some of these complaints of wrongful 
behavior.68 The court concluded that the WPA did not protect 
64. Willis v. Dep't of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
65. Id. (discussing the implications ofallowing Willis's claim to stand). 
66. Huffman v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, (Fed. Cir. 2(01). 
67. Id at 1345. 
68. ld at 1353. 
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disclosures made by an employee as part of his nonna! job duties.69 
However, the court did allow for two exceptions to this general rule. 
First, disclosures that were a normal part of the employee's job, if made 
to someone outside of the nonnal chain of command, would be 
protected. Second, if the type of disclosure were one that the employee 
would not ordinarily make, then that disclosure would be protected.70 
In concluding that disclosures made pursuant to the employee's 
nonnal job duties were not protected, the court reiterated one of the 
rationales it expressed in Willis. The court focused on the goal of the 
WP A, which the court defined in both Willis and Huffman as protecting 
employees who "go above and beyond the call of duty" by disclosing 
hidden wrongdoing.71 According to the court, Congress did not intend 
to protect employees whose nonnaljob duties require such disclosures.72 
While the court in Willis provided no real support for this supposition, 
the Huffman court did identify some indirect support by citing to several 
statements made during the legislative process, which noted that the 
WP A was not designed to protect poor perfonning employees from 
discipline.73 It is unclear how these statements indicate that disclosures 
made pursuant to nonnal job duties should not be covered. Perhaps the 
court was suggesting that all whistleblowers whose jobs require 
reporting wrongdoing are poor perfonners seeking to shield themselves 
from adverse employment action by claiming protection under the 
WPA. 
The court also justified its conclusion by detennining that the WP A 
was "ambiguous,,,74 despite the fact that just paragraphs earlier the court 
had interpreted the same portion of the statute75 without referencing any 
ambiguity.76 The court did not rely on one of the key rationales it cited 
in Willis-that this was the nonnal type of disagreement between 
supervisors and subordinates and thus was not appropriate for protection 
under the WP A. 
The court's analysis is flawed in many ways. First, the Huffman court 
began its analysis with an incorrect assessment of the statutory language 
by claiming that it was ambiguous 77 and, therefore, required analysis of 




72. Huffman v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. eir. 2001). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1352. 
75. The court failed to specifY what aspect of the WPA was ambiguous. However, the language 
at issue appears to be the "any disclosure" language. 
76. Id 
77. Id 
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of statutory construction, it would have had a difficult time justifying its 
conclusion. The statute states that "any disclosure" of illegal activity, 
gross mismanagement, or waste of government funds is protected 
activity.78 The statute provides no limitation as to whom the disclosure 
must be made. The plain language is unambiguous and thus supports 
the interpretation that a disclosure made in the course of one's normal 
job duties is protected. Furthermore, the lack of an express exclusion 
should be considered in light of the fact that many whistleblower 
statutes do specify to whom protected disclosures must be made.79 
Therefore, in these jurisdictions, disclosures made in the course of 
performing one's job may not be protected in all circumstances; instead, 
protections will depend on the person to whom the disclosure is made.80 
The Huffman court was also incorrect in its assertion that there was 
"no clear evidence in the legislative history" of the WP A to support the 
idea that disclosures made in the course of an employee's normal job 
duties were covered by the wpA.81 The WPA amended the 
whistleblower provisions created by the Civil Service Act of 1978. 
Under that statute, "a disclosure" was protected if it met certain criteria. 
The WP A changed the statutory language from "a disclosure" to "any 
disclosure," indicating that a broader meaning should be used.82 Further 
solidifying this evidence of intent to provide coverage to more 
disclosures than under the CSRA is a 1988 report discussing the 
proposed WP A. In this report, a Senate Committee noted: 
For example, it is inappropriate for disclosures to be protected only if 
they are made for certain purposes or to certain employee or only if the 
employee is the first to raise the issue. S. 508 emphasizes this point by 
changing the phrase 'a disclosure' to 'any disclosure' in the statutory 
definition.83 
Thus, the plain language and legislative history of the WP A are at odds 
with the Huffman decision. 
Looking beyond the plain language and legislative history, the 
Huffman court also adopted the Willis conclusion that an employee 
executing his normal job duties and thereby disclosing wrongdoing is 
not risking his job and therefore not a person who should be entitled to 
78. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2008). 
79. See WESTMAN & MODESrIT, supra note 9, at 70-71, app. A at 281, app. Bat 309 (compiling 
state statutes protecting whistIeblowers and noting that many contain such limitations). 
80. Some states have imposed limitations on the type of disclosure that is protected. The most 
common type is that the disclosure must be made in good faith. This is a far narrower limitation on 
protections than the job duties exclusion, as it focuses on the employee's motivation in making the 
disclosure. See. e.g., Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196,202 (Minn. 2000). 
81. Huffman v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir.2001). 
82. See S. REp. No. 100-413, at 13 (1988). 
83. ld. 
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protection.84 As noted above, there are significant flaws in this 
conclusion. 
Huffman has been applied in numerous cases since its decision and 
remains unquestioned in the Federal Circuit.8s Indeed, Huffman'S scope 
has expanded over the years because the Federal Circuit has broadly 
interpreted the scope of what constitutes disclosures made pursuant to 
normal job duties. For example, in a broad interpretation of the job 
duties exclusion, the Federal Circuit determined that where an 
employee's normal job duties are to investigate wrongdoing and that 
employee voluntarily follows up on an initial report of wrongdoing, 
disclosures made pursuant to that voluntary work are also not 
protected.86 The court justified its decision by asserting that follow-up 
work~ven if it is not required by an employer-is a normal part of 
one's job and, therefore, falls within the scope of the Huffman 
decision.87 
C. Other Federal Statutes: Generally, No Job Duties Exclusion 
Huffman and Willis are not the only decisions grappling with the 
question of whether disclosures made pursuant to one's job duties would 
be protected by a federal statute prohibiting retaliation against 
employees.88 Courts have addressed this situation in cases involving the 
anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA). In these cases, courts responded to the job duties issue in a 
fundamentally different manner than the Huffman and Willis courts. In 
Title VII and FLSA cases, courts have considered the precise statutory 
language to determine whether job-related disclosures of wrongdoing 
are protected rather than relying upon the judicially-created job duties 
exclusion. While the anti-retaliation language in these statutes differ,89 
like the WP A, neither of them contain any language expressly excluding 
from coverage those employees who disclose unlawful conduct as part 
84. Huffmtm, 263 F.3d at 1353. 
85. A current KeyCite search of Huffman reveals over 370 citing references, almost exclusively 
positive. 
86. Fields v. Dep't of Justice, 452 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
87. ld. at 1305. 
88. As discussed above, in addition to generalized whistleblower protection statutes, some 
whistleblowers are also protected under other, topic-specific federal statutes. Probably the best-known 
of these types of whistleblower protections is found in Title vn of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
protects employees who oppose unlawful employment discrimination or participate in a Title VII 
proceeding or investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). Environmental protection statutes also 
contain protections for whistleblowers; for instance, the Clean Air Act contains a provision prohibiting 
retaliation against employees who commence proceedings or assist in enforcement of the Act. 42 
U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2006). 
89. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) with 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
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of their job duties.90 
Perhaps because of this, for many years, the job duties exclusion was 
not developed or discussed. Title VII provides an interesting example 
because its anti-retaliation provisions have existed for half a century. 
These provisions provide protection for two forms of employee conduct: 
(l) conduct opposing unlawful employment discrimination and (2) 
conduct where an employee participates in a Title VII proceeding or 
investigation.91 Employees in human resources are an obvious target for 
the job duties exclusion, as they must frequently assess and report to 
supervisors whether unlawful discrimination has occurred. The job 
duties exclusion argument would be that those who report unlawful 
discrimination as part of their jobs, such as human resources personnel 
who report violations of Title VII to their supervisors, are not entitled to 
protection against retaliation under Title VII. 
Rather than adopting a per se exclusion for those whose jobs involve 
the investigation and participation in discrimination claims, courts have 
assessed each situation on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 1986, 
the Sixth Circuit addressed a retaliation claim of a human resources 
employee.92 The court did not mention the idea of a per se job duties 
exclusion at all.93 Instead, the court focused on the particular actions of 
the employee and whether the employee's conduct opposed unlawful 
discrimination, whether the employee participated in a Title VII 
investigation or ~oceeding, or instead, whether the employee was a 
passive observer. Merely acting as a scribe to document claims of 
discrimination was held insufficient to be protected activity due to the 
lack of active participation or opposition.9 Other cases also show an 
analysis of the particular conduct of the plaintiff in each case and 
include no discussion of a categorical exclusion for reports made as a 
part of one's job.96 
90. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) (2006). 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
92. Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1986). 
93. At one point, the court indirectly suggested that the prevailing thinking might go in the 
opposite direction when it stated that, "[a]n employee does not receive special protection under Title VII 
simply because the employee handles discrimination complaints .... " ld at 75 I. 
94. Seeid. 
95. Interestingly, this passive versus active participation rationale is now of questionable 
validity. In 2009, the Supreme Court determined that an employee who was merely responded to a 
company's questions regarding a co-worker's allegations of sexual harassment was protected against 
retaliation for providing information that supported the co-worker's allegations. Crawford v. Metro. 
Gov't of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
96. See. e.g., EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543 (Sth Cir. 1998) (holding that human resources 
employee who refused to implement an order violating Title VII engaged in protected activity); Matta v. 
Snow, No. Civ.A. 02-S62(CKK), 2005 WL 3454334 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,2005) (holding that engaging in 
neutral assessment of other employees' Title VII complaints was not sufficient to establish protected 
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The approach courts used for interpreting Title VII is similar to that 
used for interpreting the FLSA. For instance, in McKenzie v. Renberg's, 
Inc. 97 the court examined a human resources employee's actions to 
determine whether she had engaged in protected activity under the 
FLSA. The FLSA protects employees who file a complaint or bring a 
claim under the FLSA or who testify in any proceeding under the Act,98 
The court was unwilling to allow a claim by an employee who raised 
concerns about other employees' rightS.99 Focusing on the specific 
statutory language, the court noted that the human resources employee 
had merely advised the company of potential violations; she had not 
filed a comrlaint nor had she assisted other employees in raising a 
complaint, 10 On the other hand, where a human resources employee 
took the additional step of refusing to obey an order that violated the 
FLSA, that conduct was held to be protected. 101 Here, again, no 
categorical job duties exclusion was adopted. 
However, there is one instance of a federal court adopting the job 
duties exclusion in interpreting antiretaliation provisions of federal law. 
In 2005, a Court of Appeals panel for the Sixth Circuit determined that 
when an employee engages in activities that are a part of the employee's 
job duties, such activities cannot be protected activities under the Clean 
Air Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, or the Federal Water Pollution 
Control ACt,102 The plaintiff in Sasse was an Assistant United States 
Attorney whose job was to investigate and prosecute environmental 
crimes. He alleged that after one such investigation and prosecution, he 
was retaliated against by receiving heavier caseloads, worse 
assignments, taunting at the office, and the assignment of a drunken 
secretary who harassed him.103 
The issue of whether the employee's actions were protected even 
activity). 
97. McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996). 
98. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). The FLSA also prohibits retaliation for serving on an 
industrial committee, but that was not as issue in this case. 
99. See McKenzie, 94 F.3d at 1486. 
100. Id There is language in McKenzie that could be read as consistent with the job duties 
exclusion. At one point, the court states that the plaintiff must "step outside of his or her role" as a 
human resources employee who advises the employer on conduct in order to engage in protected 
activity. See id. at 1486-87. However, until Gareelli, this language had been interpreted to mean that 
the employee must act in a way that shows opposition to the employer's conduct, not that conduct 
undertaken within one's normal job duties was unprotected. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.O. Mich. 2004) (focusing on employee taking a position adverse to the 
company). 
101. See Frazier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 1:02CY650900WWDLB, 2005 WL 1335245 
(E.O. Cal. May 3, 2005). 
102. Sasse v. U.S. Oep't ofLabor, 409 F.3d 773, 780 (6th Cir. 2005). 
103. Id. at 717. 
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though they were a part of his job duties was one of first impression 
under these environmental protection statutes. Rather than drawing 
upon the Title VII andlor FLSA cases, which are more similar to the 
environmental statutes in the sense that they are topic-specific 
whistleblower protections, the court cited to both Huffman and Willis, 
and adopted the courts' approach. I04 The court used one of the 
rationales from Huffman and Willis: only employees who risk their job 
security by taking steps to protect the public good are protected by 
whistleblower provisions and that doing one's job does not constitute 
risking one's own job security. lOS As in Huffman and Willis, the court 
purported to engage in statutory construction and to rely on the plain 
language of the statutes. However, the court actually engaged in even 
less statutory interpretation than in Huffman; the court never identified 
any language in the statutes that would support the job duties exclusion 
and failed to even address the policies underlying the statutes.106 In fact, 
there is nothing in the plain language of the statutes that suggests reports 
made pursuant to one's job are excluded from coverage of the 
statutes. 107 
Sasse remains the only example of any court adopting the Huffman 
job duties exclusion, other than cases brought under the WPA, before 
Garcetti. 108 It is quite possible that the Huffman job duties exclusion 
would have remained in its limited universe in perpetuity had Garcetti 
not been decided as it was by the Supreme Court. 
III. ASSESSING THE JOB DUTIES EXCLUSION 
This Article has already assessed the job duties exclusion as a matter 
of statutory interpretation and concluded that the analyses of courts that 
have adopted the job duties exclusion are fundamentally flawed. 109 
Looking beyond the analytical failings of these decisions, the job duties 
exclusion is incompatible with the policies behind whistleblower 
protection statutes and inconsistent with whistleblowing theory and 
research. The job duties exclusion also creates behavioral incentives for 
external reporting that are not optimal for individuals or employers. 
104. [d. at 7S0. 
lOS. See id. at 7S0. 
106. See id. at 779-a0. 
107. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U .S.C. § 1367(b) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 697 I (b) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(1) (2006). 
lOS. For a complete discussion of the cases citing to HujJmDn before Gareeni, see Part III.B., 
infra. 
109. See supra Partll.C. 
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A. Incompatibility with Statutory Policy and Whistleblowing Research 
One of the fundamental policy justifications underlying 
whistleblowing statutes and common law claims is the need to disclose 
wrongdoing in order to protect the public. In statutes involving 
government whistleblowers, this is seen in the text of the law, which 
focuses on the need to protect the public purse against improper use of 
funds. I 10 This justification finds its genesis as far back as the False 
Claims Act, which sought to limit the fraud being perpetrated by 
contractors against the federal government. The need to have employee-
whistleblowers uncover this misuse of government funds lies in the 
nature of the wrongdoing. It is hidden, a type of corporate white-collar 
crime. Unlike the victims of violent crime, the government is unaware 
of the wrongdoing most of the time. III The goals of protecting the 
public purse and public safety were highlighted in the Senate Report on 
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which states: 
Whenever misdeeds take place in a federal agency, there are employees 
who know that it has occurred, and who are outraged by it. What is 
needed is a means to assure them that they will not suffer if they help 
uncover and correct administrative abuses. What is needed is a means to 
protect the Pentagon employee who discloses billions of dollars in cost 
overruns, the GSA employee who discloses widespread fraud, and the 
nuclear engineer who questions the safety of certain nuclear plants. 
These conscientious civil servants deserve statutory protection rather than 
bureaucratic harassment and intimidation. I 12 
As is evident from this passage, the goals behind whistleblowing 
protections also range from protecting public funds to protecting the 
public's physical safety. A recent example of the focus on physical 
safety is seen in the 2007 passage of a law to implement 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.113 Parts of this law focus on 
increasing the safety of public transportation, and these portions contain 
strong whistleblower protection provisions. I 14 
In the private sector, safety concerns were the driving force behind 
the beginning of the modem whistleblowing movement. Ralph Nader's 
consumer safety advocacy in the 1970s is frequently credited as one of 
110. See. e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006). 
Ill. See TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK 28-29 (1999) (discussing the hidden 
nature of criminal activity in the modem workplace); Ramirez, supra note II, at 226 (discussing the 
hidden nature of white collar crime as a rationale for creating a blanket federal whistleblower protection 
statute). 
112. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2730. 
113. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of2007, Pub. L. No. 110-053. 
114. Id. at § 1413. For a description of these provisions, see WESTMAN & MODESm, supra note 
9, at 3-18 (Supp. 2010). 
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the driving forces behind modem whistleblower protection.1lS The 
focus of this movement was protecting the public from dangerous 
products produced by private companies. This goal of protecting public 
interests, as opposed to private interests, is evident in the decisions 
limiting whistleblowing claims to situations where there is a public 
interest present, not merely a private interest of the disclosing 
employee. I 16 
While the need to protect the public purse was an initial rationale for 
encouraging whistleblowing in the government, recently, the protections 
for whistleblowers in the private sector have extended beyond protecting 
physical safety to protecting financial security. For instance, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act created 
whistleblower protections for employees who provide information about 
violations of securities laws. This act also created a bounty system 
allowing these employees to share in a portion of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's recovery of funds from the employer. ll7 
Beyond the protection of the public's financial and physical safety, 
protecting employees who are carrying out job duties when they disclose 
wrongdoing also comports with the concept of the rule of law. 118 
Disclosure of wrongdoing promotes enforcement and compliance with 
the law.119 Employees are particularly effective at promoting 
compliance because of their placement and ability to detect unlawful 
behavior. Outsider inspectors and auditors put companies on alert, 
allowing the concealment of unlawful conduct. Employees are better 
positioned to see the normal conduct of the company. Protecting those 
who engage in disclosure encourages such disclosure and thereby 
promotes greater compliance by companies with legal requirements. 
In addition, whistleblower statutes also embody a policy in favor of 
protecting employees' other, non-whistleblowing rights. 120 In other 
words, whistleblowing protection provisions help protect an employee's 
other substantive rights by ensuring that employees do not have to 
choose between losing their jobs and exercising other rights. 121 
All these policy goals-to protect public money, promote safety, 
115. See WESTMAN & MODESI1T, supra note 9, at 10. 
116. See. e.g., Foley v.lnteractive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
117. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L No. 111-203, 
§ 922. 
118. See Robert Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower 
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L REv. 581,586 (1999). 
119. See MIETHE, supra note Ill, at 85-86 (discussing importance of whistle blowing provisions 
to ensuring compliance with laws). 
120. See Lobel, supra note 14, at 456-57 (describing the rights-based rationale for whistleblower 
protections). 
121. Lobel,supranote 14,at456-S7. 
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protect private finances, encourage compliance with the law, and 
support individual rights-support strong protections for employee-
whistleblowers. The job duties exclusion renders this valuable insider 
extremely wlnerable to retaliation for engaging in whistleblowing 
behavior. Employees are most likely to have insider information about 
employer wrongdoing when that conduct is something that they 
encounter on the job. It seems doubtful that most employees are 
actively looking outside of their duties for wrongdoing by their 
employers. The job duties exclusion forecloses protection in most 
instances where the employee's job involves investigation and 
disclosure of wrongdoing. This means that where employees are likely 
to have the most accurate information about wrongdoing, they are least 
likely to be protected if they disclose it. The lack of protection for these 
employees suggests that less whistleblowing will occur to the detriment 
of public safety and public and private financial interests. 122 
Empirical research on whistleblowing suggests employees whose job 
requires disclosure of wrongdoing are particularly well-situated to be 
effective whistleblowers. In a study of what makes individuals more 
likely to report wrongdoing, one of the key factors affecting 
whistleblowing behavior was the role of the employee.123 Where the 
employee's role was one in which the employee had some responsibility 
for reporting wrongdoing, the employee was more likely to engage in 
whistleblowing behavior.124 These individuals were perceived of as 
having more credibility when they engaged in whistleblowing, as 
compared to employees whose jobs lacked such a role. 125 These 
employees are most clearly barred from whistleblower protection by the 
job duties exclusion because the terms of their job require reporting 
wrongdoing. 
The exclusion is also unjustifiable because it operates to place greater 
weight on the employer's interests in controlling its employees than on 
the need to disclose illegal behavior. The exclusion, which is not 
written into whistleblowing statutes, represents a judicial re-weighing of 
the relative interests of the employer, the employee, and the public. 
Were the exclusion incorporated into the claim for wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy, it might be justifiable as a part of the 
balancing of interests that the judicial branch has undertaken in creating 
122. However, those employees who have an obligation to disclose that is derived from a source 
outside of their employment duties, such as an attorney's ethical obligations, may still disclose 
wrongdoing due to such obligation. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991). 
123. See Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistleblowing Process: Suggestions from Power 
Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 393, 398, 402 (1993). 
124. Id 
125. Id. at 404. 
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new substantive legal rights. However, when the exclusion is grafted 
onto statutes which lack any language suggesting its existence, its 
legitimacy is questionable at best. 
What interest of the employer, other than the general interest in 
controlling the workplace, might justify the job duties exclusion? One 
that has been raised is an employee's fiduciary obligations to the 
corporation. 126 The duty of loyalty requires that the employee act on 
behalf of the company and in the best interests of the company. The 
obligations imposed on an employee by this duty depend on the 
employee's position within the company. For example, a CEO is bound 
by much tighter constraints than is a janitor. A CEO would be 
prohibited from working for a competitor company by the duties of care 
and loyalty; a janitor would not. 
The practical impact of the job duties exclusion is to foreclose 
protection even where, in reality, there is no tension between the goals 
of promoting public safety and employee's duty of loyalty to the 
corporation. The tension between the whistleblowing policy goals of 
protecting the public and the employee's duty to be loyal to the 
company can be obvious in some instances. Where an employee knows 
that the company's product could be made safer by changes in the 
manufacturing or design of the product that would come at a high cost, 
does the employee act in the interest of the public (greater safety) or the 
interests of the company (cost savings)? Not all situations, however, 
exhibit such a tension; what may be in the best interests of the public 
(greater safety) may also be in the best interests of the company. For 
example, if the product in question could be made safer at a slightly 
increased cost, it may be in the interests of the company to change the 
design or manufacturing of the product in order to decrease the number 
of tort claims brought against it for harms caused by the product. The 
savings created by reducing the number of claims may offset or exceed 
the costs of making the design changes, manufacturing changes, or 
both.127 What does this mean for the job duties exclusion? Given the 
goal of producing a safer society, if there is no tension, then there is no 
benefit to the job duties exclusion. If it is in the interests of the 
company to have the behavior disclosed, then there is no theoretical 
justification for allowing retaliation against the employee. At a 
minimum, this suggests that the job duties exclusion is unjustified where 
126. See. e.g., Willis v. Dep't of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the 
employee's ''fiduciary obligations" to his employer); Sasse v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 780 
(6th Cir. 2(05); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 28-30. 
127. This type of situation could arise where there is imperfect information sharing within the 
company, such as where key decision makers are not informed of possible alternative designs, costs of 
litigation, or the likelihood of litigation. 
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the best interests of the company lie in disclosure of the unlawful 
conduct. 
Other employer interests merit inclusion in the assessment of the job 
duties exclusion. First, there is the need to control the workplace and 
engage in normal disciplinary practices.128 The concern here appears to 
be that if reports made pursuant to one's job duties are protected 
disclosures, the employee can never be disciplined for making a bad 
report. Or, to put it more generally, employers fear that poor performers 
will use whistleblower protections as a shield against legitimate 
discipline. Another employer concern relates to jobs involving 
compliance with legal standards. Employers fear that any discussion of 
compliance will be a protected report: if there is a genuine disagreement 
as to whether conduct is lawful, the employee cannot be disciplined for 
continuing to raise the issue even if the employer tells the employee to 
drop it.129 Thus, this employee becomes disruptive in the workplace. 
These are legitimate concerns of the employer. However, the answer 
to these concerns is not to exclude all reports made pursuant to an 
employee's job. First, as to the disciplinary concern, if the employer 
engages in discipline due to poor job performance, the disclosure of 
wrongdoing does not render the discipline unlawful merely because the 
poor performance relates to the discipline.13o The finder of fact would 
be responsible for determining whether the true reason for discipline 
was a report of wrongdoing or poor performance. l3l Second, as to 
employees in compliance positions, these are the most crucial persons to 
protect in order to ensure whistleblowing continues. Employees in 
compliance positions are the ones most likely to see violations of the 
law in the company-it is in the nature of their work. Broadly 
excluding these employees' reports from protection would greatly 
undermine efforts at disclosing unlawful employer conduct. However, 
courts need not give carte blanche to these employees in the manner and 
the nature of their reports. For instance, the employee who keeps 
pressing his concerns after the employer has attempted to address them 
128. This argument was made by the court in Huffma" and is discussed in Part n.A., supra. This 
argument was also made by the employer in Kidwell. See Brief and Appendix of Respondent Sybaritic, 
Inc., Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (No. A07-584), 2008 WL 7967961. 
129. See, e.g., Haddox v. Att'y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077 (Dh. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 
2008) (discussing the compliance position situation). 
130. Most courts allow the employer to avoid liability by proving that the employer would have 
taken the same action even if the employee had not engaged in the whistleblowing behavior. See 
WESTMAN & MODEsrrr, supra note 9, at 234-35, 239-40 (noting that whistleblowing claims typically 
borrow Title VII burdens of proof); see also Suggs v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 415 F. App'x 240 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (affirming decision that employer's discipline of poor performing employee was proper 
despite employee's assertion that it was retaliation for engaging in whistleblowing). 
131. See, e.g., Ivey v. Department of the Treasury, 107 F. App'x 918 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (containing 
factual allegations ofpoor performance by employer versus whistleblowing activity by the employee). 
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can lose protection by being unduly disruptive in reporting alleged 
wrongdoing. 132 Legitimate employer concerns can be addressed using 
existing doctrines that are more narrowly tailored to meet these concerns 
than is the job duties exclusion. The job duties exclusion replaces these 
fact-specific approaches with a broad exclusion, favoring interests of 
employers over the interests of the public and of the employee 
disclosing wrongdoing. 
B. Internal vs. External Reporting and the Job Duties Exclusion 
The job duties exclusion incentivizes external reporting by 
foreclosing protections for reports made to one's supervisor pursuant to 
one's job. Under the job duties exclusion, there are only two situations 
in which a person whose job involves the investigation and/or disclosure 
of wrongdoing is protected: (1) where the disclosure is made outside of 
normal reporting channels and (2) where the disclosure is not one that is 
normally a part of the job.133 The simplest way to avoid the job duties 
exclusion is to report wrongdoing to an outside entity. Making a 
disclosure to the press, for example, will generally not be a disclosure in 
the normal channel or a disclosure that the employee is normally 
required to make, placing it within both exceptions to the job duties 
exclusion. 
One might believe that because external disclosures are likely to 
remain protected even under the job duties exclusion, the exclusion will 
not have a significant negative impact on whistleblowing behavior. 
There are two flaws with this belief. First, most whistleblowers do not 
use external channels to report wrongdoing. In a study of 
whistleblowers, only 30% indicated that they would report wrongdoing 
externally.134 The author of the study, Terance Miethe, posits that one 
of the reasons for this is the social conditioning not to air private dirty 
laundry in pUblic. 135 Furthermore, in some instances internal reporting 
is not mere social conditioning: it is required. For instance, if an 
employee wants to obtain monetary relief under Title VII for reporting 
certain types of unlawful harassment on the job, the employee must 
report the harassment to the employer internally, use the company's 
normal reporting procedures, and give the company the opportunity to 
132. See. e.g., Dunham v. Brock, 794 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1986); see also WESTMAN & 
MODESITT, supra note 9, at 236-37 (discussing potential employer defenses involving disruptive 
employees). 
133. SeeHuffinan v. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d. 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
134. MIElHE, supra note Ill, at 64. 
135. ld. 
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take corrective action and stop the harassment.136 In addition, reporting 
externally may lead to the employee breaching confidentiality 
requirements and, ultimately, may result in the employee losing the 
protection of whistleblowing statutes.137 These types of legal 
requirements strengthen the sense of employees that one should first 
report internally. The job duties exclusion penalizes the employee who 
does what he is socially and legally conditioned to do. 
In addition, excluding internal reporting from protected behavior 
helps create a workplace where the culture discourages whistleblowing. 
Where employees receive the message that internal disclosures are not 
welcome, a belief that no disclosures should be made, either internally 
or externally, is fostered. This leads to the development of a company 
that has fewer overall disclosures ofwrongdoing.138 
Furthermore, a disclosure to outsiders rather than insiders is typically 
not the ideal way to address wrongdoing. First, it is contrary to the duty 
of loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires an employee to act in the best 
interests of the employer. When faced with disclosing wrongdoing to 
the company itself or disclosing it externally, it would be better for the 
company to have a chance to correct the ~roblem internally before the 
wrongdoing becomes known to outsiders. 1 9 In addition, putting to one 
side duty of loyalty considerations, external reportin~ is likely to be 
either disruptive to an organization or ineffective. 14 If the person 
receiving the report of wrongdoing does nothing, the report is 
ineffective. If the person receiving the report acts on it, disruption 
ensues for a number of reasons. First, the employer will not be 
receiving the information through its normal channels. Those best 
equipped to address the wrongdoing may be placed in a defensive 
position, reacting to outside pressure rather than conducting a more 
neutral investigation. This is particularly possible if, as is the case in 
most larger organizations today, the entity has personnel and channels 
devoted to handling such reports. For instance, most employers have 
created mechanisms for reporting violations of Title VII, partiCUlarly 
instances of sexual harassment. A report to an external entity may not 
trigger the normal investigative process. For instance, newspaper 
reports of harassment may trigger a response at a higher corporate level 
and involve those who are not normally a part of such investigations, 
136. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (199S) (establishing an affirmative 
defense for employers to certain Title VII claims). 
137. For instance, under SOX, the disclosure of confidential infonnation externally resulted in the 
employee losing his whistleblowing claim. See Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d S09 (9th Cir. 2011). 
13S. See MIETHE, supra note Ill, at 64 (discussing how corporate culture can affect rates of 
whistleblowing behavior). 
139. See Near et aI., supra note 123, at 395. 
140. See Vaughn, supra note liS, at 599 (discussing the potential for disruption). 
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tainting the result and removing those individuals from their daily 
duties. 
Additional empirical support for the perverse results of the job duties 
exclusion is found in a recent study of whistleblowers and what lel1al 
structures were the best at maximizing reporting of wrongdoing. 41 
Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel concluded that imposing a duty to report 
wrongdoing can increase rates of whistleblowing. If a duty to report 
increases whistleblowing behavior and suggests that those whose jobs 
involve a required report (making it a duty) are more likely to engage in 
whistleblowing behavior. The job duties exclusion places employees 
into a bind, where they owe an obligation to report but are not protected 
when they do so. The exclusion also creates potential for employer 
abuse. Specifically, by drafting employees' job descriptions to include a 
duty to report unlawful conduct, the employer limits the likelihood of 
employees' reports being protected by whistleblowing statutes. 
In addition, the job duties exclusion also has the potential to bar 
another likely group of whistleblowers: those who know the appropriate 
channels within an organization to report wrongdoing. 142 Research has 
indicated that whistleblowing is more likely to occur among employees 
who are aware of the proper reporting channels and procedures.143 
Those who report within appropriate channels are unlikely to be 
protected due to the job duties exclusion. This may push individuals to 
report wrongdoing outside of the organization. The unfortunate result of 
this is likely to be greater retaliation against the employee, as there is 
also evidence that external whistleblowers are more likely to be 
retaliated against than those who report internally. 144 
On the other hand, there are some benefits to external reporting. 
First, it has the potential to bring unlawful behavior to the attention of 
law enforcement more quickly, before the company can engage in a 
cover-up. However, the determination of whether external or internal 
reporting is to be preferred has already been made by legislatures in 
crafting whistleblower protection statutes. As noted above, some 
statutes require internal reporting, while others require reporting to 
external entities. 145 The fact that such variations exist illustrates the 
legislative choices that are incorporated into the whistleblower statutes. 
The judicially created job duties exclusion ignores this legislative 
preference. 
141. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of 
Rewards. Liabilities. Duties and Protectionsfor Reporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1151 (2010). 
142. Near et aI., supra note 123 at 398. 
143. Id. at 398. 
144. MARCIA MICELI ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS liS (2008). 
145. See. e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-26A-I (2010); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-531 (2010). 
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A second justification for requiring external reporting is that it creates 
a bright-line rule that is easy for courts to administer. Indeed, the ease 
of judicial administration is a potential justification for the entirety of 
the job duties exclusion, not just the aspect of it that encourages external 
reporting. After all, an inquiry into the parameters of an employee's job 
is eminently susceptible to resolution without a trial, as there are 
relatively few facts at issue. The entire debate over whether the 
employee was subject to negative treatment, and if so, why it occurred, 
can be sidestepped if the report was within the employee's job duties. 
Even so, the ease of judicial administration is an insufficient 
justification for a doctrine that effectively erases statutory protections 
for some whistleblowers. 
N. INFECTING THE STATES AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES 
The job duties exclusion has existed for over a decade. During much 
of that time, it remained solely applicable to the WP A. It has only been 
since Garcetti146 that the job duties exclusion has shown signs of 
beginning to expand its reach to state statutes, as will be discussed in 
detail below. Before discussing the expansion of the job duties 
exclusion, it is necessary to first understand Garcetti itself and its effect 
on the whistleblower protections available to governmental employees. 
A. Garcetti as a Whistleblower Case 
As noted above, there has been much scholarly analysis of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos,147 most of it negative in nature.148 This Article will consider 
Garcetti from a different perspective than much of the existing 
scholarship. To date, many of the analyses of Garcetti assess it from the 
perspective of First Amendment doctrine as applied to governmental 
employees.149 This is the obvious context in which to assess Garcetti. 
146. The notable exception to this is the Sasse decision applying thejob duties exclusion to three 
federal environmental statutes. Sasse v. u.s. Dep't of Labor, 409 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2005). However, 
this seems to be a unique case, as it involved a federal employee seeking whisteblower protection; as 
noted above, this put the attorneys in the case in the position of being aware of Willis, and Huffman. It 
is highly unlikely that the job duties exclusion would show the signs it is currently showing of becoming 
generally applicable based solely on Sasse; the publicity surrounding Garcetli popularized the concept. 
147. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
148. See supra note 5. 
149. See. e.g., Sheldon H. Nabmod, Public Employee Speech. Categorical Balancing and § 1983: 
A Critique ofGarcetti v. Ceballos,42 U. RICH. L. REv. 561 (2008); Andrew Bernie, A PrinCipled 
Limitation an Judicial Interjerence: Garcetti v. Ceballos. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006),30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 1047 (2007); Stephen Safstrom, Government Employee. Are You a "Citizen"?: Garcetti v. 
Ceballos and the "Citizenship" Prong to the PickerinSIConnick Protected Speech Test, 52 St. LoUIS U. 
L.J. 589, pt. 1(2008). 
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However, there is another context in which Garcetti exists as well: the 
web of protections for governmental employee whistleblowers. 
The plaintiff in Garcetti was a district attorney in California. Defense 
counsel contacted him and expressed concern about certain aspects of a 
specific case, particularly a warrant that had produced evidence leading 
to an indictment of defense counsel's client. Ceballos investigated the 
situation, which was something "not unusual" for a district attorney in 
his position as a calendar deputy officer to do. ISO The district attorney 
reported to his supervisors his belief that a warrant contained serious 
factual misrepresentations and that the indictment it produced should be 
dismissed. Ceballos's recommendation led to a meeting that included 
Ceballos, his supervisors, and the sheriff's officers who had been 
involved in the case. The meeting was heated and, ultimately, 
Ceballos's recommendations were rejected. Ceballos brought suit, 
alleging violations of his First Amendment rights because he allegedly 
suffered retaliation after the contentious meeting.lsl 
Ceballos' employer argued that because Ceballos had been speaking 
in the meeting as an employee, not a citizen, his speech was not 
protected under the First Amendment. IS2 The Supreme Court agreed, 
holding that ''when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline."ls3 
Garcetti has been much discussed and much criticized. Within this 
discussion, there has been some analysis of Garcetti's implications for 
whistleblowers. ls4 However, less attention has been paid to Garcetti's 
role in acting as the final nail in the coffin of the federal employee who 
discloses wrongdoing as part of his job. ISS While the employee in 
Garcetti was a state attorney, the same situation could easily present 
itself to a federal attorney. The WPA does- not protect the federal 
employee who informs his supervisors of wrongdoing-a potentially 
illegal search-because his report is part of his job duties. He is not 
covered by the exceptions to Huffman because he made the report to his 
supervisor within his chain of command, and this type of report is one 
ISO. Garcetti. 547 u.s. at 414. 
151. Id. at 414-15. 
152. Petition for Writ o(Certiorari at 13-14. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-
473).2004 WL 2260964. 
153. Garcetti. 547 U.S. at 421. 
154. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 14, at 451-55; Amanda Leiter, "Whistle .. . and You've Got an 
Audience," 36 FORDHAM URB. L.l. 747, 765-66 (2009); lohn Sanchez, The Law 01 &talialion after 
Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. 1. TRIAL ADvOC. 539, 562-{)3 (2007~ 
ISS. Lobel, supra note 14, at 453 (addressing, albeit briefly, the issue of a fedeml employee 
disclosing wrongdoing as part of his job). 
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that a federal employee is normally expected to make in performing his 
job. Nor is he protected by the First Amendment due to Garcetti. 
Scholars have failed to note the fascinating adoption of a doctrine that 
appears to be derived from Huffman, without discussion or attribution, 
into First Amendment jurisprudence. Certainly the Supreme Court must 
have been aware of the job duties exclusion applicable to WP A claims. 
It was brought to the Court's attention in several of the many amici 
briefs filed in Garcetti.156 The Government Accountability Project 
(GAP), together with the National Employment Lawyers Association 
and the American Trial Lawyers Association, filed a brief that explained 
how the WPA's job duties exclusion would bar a statutory claim for a 
federal employee. The brief noted that, ''the [WPA] no longer covers 
speech that is part of carryin~ out assigned duties, except if the results 
are taken outside channels." I The brief cited both Willis and Huffman 
in support of this proposition. 
The National Treasury Employees Union also brought the job duties 
exclusion to the Court's attention, noting, "Courts have denied er 
protection to employees who are performing their normally assigned 
duties in reporting waste, fraud and abuse.,,158 The brief then cited 
Sasse, Huffman, and Willis in support of this proposition. The United 
States' amicus brief in Garcetti also mentioned Huffman but 
downplayed its significance.159 The United States was supporting the 
state government's position in Garcetti, seeking to limit the employee's 
First Amendment rights. Its reference to Huffman focused on the fact 
that under some circumstances, an employee could still be protected for 
reports made in the workplace.160 This discrepancy in the descriptions 
of HUffmanl61 contained in the briefs should have at least triggered some 
inquiry into the contours of the Huffman holding, which would lead the 
Court to an understanding of the limited statutory protections for federal 
employees. 
The Supreme Court's awareness of the job duties exclusion is also 
evident from the fact that one of the dissenting opinions discusses the 
156. Brief of Amici Curiae Gov't Accountability Project, Nat'l Emp't Lawyers Ass'n and Ass'n 
of Trial Lawyers of Am. in Support of Respondent at 6, 22, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) 
(No. 04473),2005 WL 1767695. 
157. ld. at 22 (citing Willis v. Dep't of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Huffman v. 
Office ofPers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001». 
158. See Brief for the Nat'l Treaswy Emps. Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
19, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.4lO (2006) (No. 04473),2005 WL 1749167. 
159. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27, Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1276045. 
160. ld 
161. Another brief brought to the Court's attention the somewhat disingenuous description of 
Huffman provided by the United States. See Brief of Elaine Mittleman as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2006 WL 730744. 
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problem created by Garcetti and the pre-existing job duties exclusion. 
Justice Souter's dissent expressly acknowledged the lack of protection 
under the WP A for federal employees' statements made in connection 
with their normal job duties, stating that, "significantly, federal 
employees have been held to be unprotected for statements made in 
connection with normal employment duties ... the very speech that the 
majority says will be covered by 'the powerful network of legislative 
enactments' ... available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.,,162 
Justice Souter also cited both Willis and Huffman in his dissent. Despite 
this, the majority opinion in Garcetti failed to discuss or even 
acknowledge that the job duties exclusion it adopted had its genesis 
elsewhere. 
In Garcetti, the Court assessed behavior that can be seen as 
whistleblowing-the report of an improper warrant-only from a First 
Amendment perspective. The Court did not consider whether the job 
duties exclusion it articulated would be appropriate as applied to a claim 
brought under a whistleblower protection statute. Whether the job 
duties exclusion should be applied to a particular whistleblower 
protection statute is a vastly different analysis than determining whether 
it applies to a First Amendment claim. This is primarily because of the 
divergent sources of these protections. On the one hand, the very idea 
that a governmental employee's speech on the job may be protected 
under the First Amendment is a doctrine developed by the Supreme 
COurt.163 The test developed by the Supreme Court, even at the outset, 
was one that required the courts to balance employer interests against 
employee interests. l64 As the Court noted in Pickering v. Board of 
Education,165 "the problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between 
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.,,166 A doctrine that directs the courts on how to engage in 
that balancing under certain circumstances is, on some level, consistent 
with this balancing concept of the First Amendment. On the other hand, 
for whistleblower protection statutes, courts are not directed to balance 
the employer and employee interests-the balancing has already been 
done by the legislature in drafting the statute. Despite the fact that these 
are fundamentally different types of analysis, the imprimatur of 
Supreme Court approval of the job duties exclusion concept appears to 
162. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,411 (2006) (citations omitted). 
163. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
164. See Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
165. [d. 
166. [d. at 568. 
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have provided an unanticipated boost to the viability of the doctrine as 
applied to statutory whistleblower claims. This is discussed in the 
following subparts. 
B. The Gareetti Virus: Preparing Courts to Accept the Huffman Job 
Duties Exclusion 
Before analyzing the degree to which the job duties exclusion has 
infected state statutes, it is helpful to understand the manner in which 
this infection has been occurring. Before Gareetti, the job duties 
exclusion existed almost in a vacuum because it applied in such a 
limited context-to federal employees.167 This would have made it 
known primarily to attorneys handling federal employee whistleblowing 
claims, not to employment lawyers handling whistleblowing issues in 
the private sector. Gareetti seems to have popularized the job duties 
exclusion, making the concept known more generally to attorneys and 
judges. Of these groups, the driving force behind the increasing number 
of courts accepting the job duties exclusion appears to be employers' 
attome~s. They have argued for its application in most whistleblowing 
cases, I 8 with some success. 
This is not to suggest that courts have unquestioningly accepted the 
job duties exclusion. The difficulty that attorneys have faced in arguing 
for the job duties exception has been that Gareetti's adoption of the job 
duties exclusion took place under the First Amendment. While there are 
a few state statutes that mirror the First Amendment, making the 
application of Gareett; immediately apparent, 169 the holding cannot 
simply be applied to most statutory claims. The First Amendment 
analysis, with its focus on the topic of the speech and the balancing test 
of governmental and employee interests,170 is entirely different from an 
analysis of the precise terms of a specific federal or state statute that 
would be necessary to determine whether the job duties exclusion 
should apply. However, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the job 
duties exclusion in one context (pursuant to the First Amendment) 
appears to have given indirect support for the job duties exclusion to be 
applied to state statutory whistleblower claimS.171 
In addition to validating the concept of the job duties exclusion, albeit 
167. While Sasse could be applied to private sector employees, it had not been. 
168. As one plaintiff's lawyer stated, "Employers always argue for it [the job duties exclusion] to 
apply." Telephone interview with Jason Zuckerman, Senior Legal Advisor, U.S. Office of Special 
Counsel (July 2,2010). 
169. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-Slq (2010). 
170. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
171. To continue with the infection analogy, Garcetl; is the virus that invades the host-court and 
makes it more amenable to accepting the Huffman job duties exclusion. 
2011] THE GARCE1TIVIRUS 167 
in a different context, Garcetti indirectly provided assistance to 
attorneys in transferring its holding to whistleblowing statutes. In his 
dissent, Justice Souter commented on the effect of Garcetti for federal 
employees and discussed Huffman and Willis. Once attorneys were 
aware of Huffman and Willis, the argument became simple: generalized 
state whistleblowing statutes should be interpreted consistent with the 
WP A, using Huffman and Willis as a guide. 
One of the significant flaws with this argument is that whistleblowing 
statutes vary, making adoption of an interpretation of the WP A subject 
to the similarities in language in the statutes. Of particular importance 
here is the variance in statutes in identifying the person to whom reports 
of wrongdoing must be made in order for statutory protections to apply 
to the employee. Some of these provisions are entirely incompatible 
with the job duties exclusion, while others render the job duties 
exclusion unnecessary. For instance, New York's whistleblower 
protection statute affirmatively requires that employees report 
wrongdoing to their supervisors and provide the employer with an 
opportunity to correct the alleged wrongdoing in order to be 
protected. l72 In other states, employees are required to report to 
appropriate enforcement authorities, making the job duties exclusion 
effectively unnecessary.173 These varying statutory provisions are 
indicative of the fact that state statutory whistleblower protections 
embody a legislative balancing of employer interests versus employee 
and public interests. Thus, courts should not simply apply Huffman and 
Willis without considering the precise language of the state statute at 
issue. 
Despite this, it appears that something, most likely Garcetti's holding, 
is overriding the normal process of statutory interpretation. The fact that 
the Supreme Court's adoption of the job duties exclusion occurred in the 
context of the First Amendment is likely overshadowed by the fact that 
the Supreme Court accepted the concept of the job duties exclusion. 
Because of this, Garcetti's acceptance of the job duties exclusionary 
concept has prepared courts to accept these arguments. 
C. Increasing Employer Use and Court Acceptance o/the Job Duties 
Exclusion 
Since Garcetti, employers' have, apparently, increasingly attempted 
to rely on the job duties exclusion to defeat a whistleblowing claim 
based on state statutory protections. Before Garcetti, there were only a 
172. N.Y. LABOR LAw § 740 (McKinney 2006). 
173. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-171 (West 2010) (requiring reports of government 
employees be made to a state investigative body). 
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few such reported cases. 174 Since then, this number has more than 
tripled. 175 
Furthermore, none of the four cases relying on Huffman that predated 
Garcett; explicitly adopted the job duties exclusion. In Mather v. 
Executive Office for Public Safety, the defendant made the argument in a 
motion for a directed verdict, which was denied.176 In Cates v. State, the 
defendant asserted the job duties exclusion in the trial court as ,part of its 
opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend,17 but that 
174. A search of Westlaw revealed four such instances of employers relying on Huffman as a 
guide to interpreting a state statute in the five years between Hu.fJrmn and Garcetli. During this 
timeftame there were also two jurisdictions whose courts had addressed the concept of the job duties 
exclusion without reference to Huffman. See Colores v. Bd. of Trs., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003); Erickson v. City of Orr, No. A05-481, 2005 WL 2277395, at·7 (Minn. Ct. App. sept. 20, 
2005); Andrews v. Northwestern Travel Servs., No. C5-97-1766, 1998 WL 100608, at ·4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 10, 1998); Gee v. Minn. State Colis. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); 
Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass'n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2005). In neither jurisdiction did the courts 
adopt a broad job duties exclusion. In C%res, the California Court of Appeals refused to apply any 
exclusion at all. In Minnesota, the courts developed a requirement that an individual whose job required 
reporting wrongdoing prove that his intent was to expose wrongdoing, not merely to fulfill the 
employee's job duties. There have also been less-successful attempts to apply the job duties exclusion 
to the anti-retaliation provisions of federal, topic-specific statutes, using Sasse as the guide and basis for 
the argument. See Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, Mather v. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety, No. 
04-1476 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 12,2006),2006 WL 3495504; Opposition to Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint, Cates v. State, No. GIC 809037 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2004), 2004 WL 
5651460; Dunleavy v. Wayne Cnty. Comm'n, No. 04-74670-CL, 2005 WL 2545740 (B.D. Mich. Aug. 
12,2005); Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S. W.3d 265 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002). 
17S. The following are cases in which the Huffman job duties exclusion was raised: Lehmann v. 
Conn. Legal Rights Project, Inc., No. CV054018378, 2007 WL IOS3941, at ·1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 
27,2007); Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Nobles v. Indus. 
Powder Coatings, Inc., No. 3:0S-CV-311 (E.D. Tenn. July 3, 2007), 2007 WL 4834450; Haddox v. 
Att'y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008); Defendants' Motion in 
Limine, Clifford v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-0682 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 
68S8342; Petition for Review, Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No. CV-09-0085-PR (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), 
2009 WL 233S091; Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Prendergast v. 
Fundamental Long Tenn Care Holdings, L.L.C., No. CV 07-01265 (D. N. Mex. June 15,2009),2009 
WL 2817454; Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Hess v. Borough of Blairsville, No. 
209-CV-00935 (W.O. Penn. Aug. 20, 2009), 2009 WL 3212944; Brief for the Defendants-Appellees, 
Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09-2060 (1st Cir. Nov. 10,2009),2009 WL 6809429; Kidwell v. 
Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010); Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, Barker v. UBS AG & UBS Sec., L.L.C., No. 3:09-CV-02084 (D. Conn. 
Jan. 22, 2010), 2010 WL 1228029; Trusz v. USB Realty Investors, L.L.C., No. 309-cv-268, 2010 WL 
1287148, at·9 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2010); Appellant's Opening Brief, Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Comm. 
ColI. Dist., No. CV-073384 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10,2010),2010 WL 348177S; Gammon v. Crisis & 
Counseling Cntrs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. Me. 2011). Not all these cases resulted in a court 
decision addressing the job duties exclusion. Five jurisdictions---{:aIifornia, Connecticut, Ohio, 
Louisiana, and Minnesota-have addressed the job duties exclusion. 
176. See Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, Mather v. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety, No. 04-
1476 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006), 2006 WL 349SS04 (articulating Huffman argument); Special 
Verdict, Mather v. Exec. Office of Pub. Safety, No. 04-1476 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 16, 2006),2006 WL 
2158974 (indicating that directed verdict was denied as the case ultimately went to the jury). 
177. See Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Cates v. State, No. GIC 
809037 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12,2004),2004 WL 5651460 (arguing for Huffman as a basis for denying 
2011] THE GARCE1TIVIRUS 169 
court ultimately decided the issue on other groundS.178 The court in 
Dunleavy v. Wayne County Commission dismissed the state statutory 
whistleblower claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as part of its 
decision dismissing a federal claim without addressing the defendant's 
proffered argument on the job duties exclusion.179 
In only one of these cases before Garcetti did the court expressly 
address the applicability of the Huffman job duties exclusion to a state 
statutory whistleblower claim. In 2002, the Texas Court of Appeals 
declined to adopt the job duties exclusion in Rogers v. City of Fort 
Worth. 180 Rogers involved a deputy sheriff who was allegedly fired for 
writing a report which contained information about a co-worker's 
conduct that violated a city ordinance. 181 The defending employer 
argued that the Huffman job duties exclusion applied, apparently 
because the employee had written the report at his supervisor's 
request. 182 The Court articulated two reasons for its refusal to follow 
Huffman. First, the Court noted that the Huffman rationale for the 
adoption of the job duties exclusion was based on its legislative history, 
which the Huffman court described as limiting the goal of the WP A to 
protecting employees who go above and beyond the call of dUty.IS3 The 
Rogers court found no similar legislative history in the Texas 
whistleblower protection statute and determined that even though the 
Texas statute was generally modeled after the WP A, this was 
insufficient to justify the adoption of the Huffman approach. l84 Second, 
the Rogers court indicated that the Huffman job duties exclusion was 
inconsistent with Texas precedent and suggested that the terms of the 
statute lacked any language that would justify the exclusion.185 
Since Garcetti, there has been an increase in the incidence of 
employers relying on the job duties exclusion.186 In addition, there are 
indications that courts are more willing to accept the job duties 
exclusion. While the majority of the post-Garcetti cases have resulted 
leave to amend complaint); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant DGC's 
Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Cates v. State, No. OIC 809037 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 25, 2005), 2005 WL 
6226000 (noting that whistleblowing claim was dismissed but not specifying basis for decision). 
178. See Cates v. Div. of Gambling & Control, No. D. 046874, 2007 WL 702229, at *11 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 8, 2007). 
179. See Opinion and Order of Dismissal, Dunleavy v. Wayne Cnty. Comm'n, No. ~v-74670 
{E.D. Mich. Aug. 16,2009),2006 WL 2375679. 
180. See Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Ct. App.2oo2). 
181. ld at 271-74. 




186. Of the thirteen cases where the Huffman job duties exclusion has been raised, only the seven 
cases discussed below appear to have resulted in a decision on whether to apply it. 
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in no direct discussion of the job duties exclusion, four jurisdictions 
since Gareetti have accepted the job duties exclusion, and one 
jurisdiction appears to have accepted the job duties exclusion in part, 
applying it to public employees but not private employees. Only one 
jurisdiction has refused to apply the job duties exclusion at all. In sum, 
what appeared to be a losing argument pre-Gareetti is now viable. 
Minnesota provides insight into how Gareetti has indirectly 
influenced courts to accept the job duties exclusion. Minnesota had 
grappled with the issue of whether disclosures made as a part of an 
employee's job were protected under the Minnesota Whistleblower 
Protection Act before Gareetti.187 While pre-Gareetti cases interpreting 
the Minnesota Act did discuss an employee's job duties, the primary 
focus was on the statute's "good faith" requirement. The good faith 
requirement provides that, in order to be protected, an employee's 
disclosure must be made in good faith. 188 This term was defined to 
provide protection only to disclosures made for the purpose of exposing 
illegality. 189 Thus, the inquiry was whether the disclosure was made 
with the purpose of exposing illegality or simply done because the 
. employee's job re~uired it. These Minnesota cases did not cite to Willis, 
Huffman, or Sasse. 90 
After Gareetti, it still took some time before Huffman and Willis 
intruded into Minnesota's analysis. In 2008, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals addressed the job duties issue in Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Ine.,191 
yet none of the briefs mentioned Gareetti, Huffman, Willis, or Sasse, 192 
and the court's decision followed the Minnesota analysis described 
187. See. e.g., Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass'n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2005) (explaining that 
the Minnesota Act protects employees in the public and private sectors). 
188. See. e.g., Gee v. Minn. State Colis. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, SSS-S6 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005) (focusing on "good faith" and intent to expose illegality in assessing whether employee 
perfonning job engsged in protected activity); Erickson v. City of Orr, No. AOS-481, 2005 WL 
2277395, at ·7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2005) (noting that intent must be to expose illegal behavior); 
Freeman, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-41 (discussing the "good faith" requirement and concluding that 
merely perfonning one's job is insufficient to establish the requisite good faith). While the good faith 
requirement is the primary mode of analysis, some cases do exist where the court fails to analyze the 
issue in depth and cursorily concludes that the report was made not to expose illegality but to perfonn 
one's job. See. e.g., Andrews v. Northwestern Travel Servs., Inc., No. CS-97-1766, 1998 WL 100608 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998) (discussing job duties without focusing on good faith or intent in 
making report). 
189. See obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196,202 (Minn. 2000). 
190. See Gee, 700 N.W.2d at SSS-S6; Erickson, 2005 WL 2277395, at ·7; Freeman, 404 F. Supp. 
2d at 1139-41. 
191. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
192. See Gee v. Minn. State Colis. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, SSS-S6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); 
Erickson v. City of Orr, No. AOS-481, 2005 WL 2277395 at *7 (Minn. App. 2005); Freeman, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1139-41. 
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above. 193 By the time that Kidwell made it to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, however, Huffman, Willis, and Garcetti were heavily cited in the 
parties' briefs,194 and Huffman went on to take center stage in the court's 
analysis. 
Kidwell195 serves as an example of the extent to which Garcetti is 
affecting the state court interpretations of state whistleblowing statutes. 
Minnesota had a decade of decisions that focused on good faith in 
assessing whether a disclosure was protected. 196 Despite this, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court took a radically different approach in 
Kidwell; one that, in effect, adopted the Huffman job duties exclusion. 
While the court explicitly stated that it was not adopting a blanket rule 
that "as a matter of law, 'an employee does not engage in protected 
conduct under the whistleblower act if the employee makes a report in 
fulfillment of the duties of his or her job, ",197 it effectively replaced its 
good faith test with the Huffman job duties exclusion. 
In order to reach this result, the court first determined that it was 
appropriate and helpful to consider cases interpreting the WP A, irrs0ring 
the fact that the WP A and Minnesota statute's language differs. 98 The 
court then suggested that it was combining the traditional Minnesota 
analysis, described above, with the Huffman approach when it decided 
that where the employee's report of wrongdoing is made pursuant to the 
employee's job duties, the employee will need to show "something 
more" in order to prove that the report was made with the intent to blow 
the whistle. This appears to do little to change existing Minnesota law. 
However, the court then went on to analyze the question of what 
"something more" would be by explicitly approving Huffman'S 
193. The Court of Appeals appeared to go one step further than earlier cases, though, when it 
stated that employees are not protected under the state whisteblower statute if the report of illegality is 
done pursuant to their job duties. This seemed to suggest that the case-by-case assessment of the 
employee's good faith intent was being replaced with an absolute bar. See Kidwell, 749N.W.2d at 857. 
194. In Kidwell, the employee, did not cite any of these sources in his initial brief. See Brief and 
Appendix of Appellant Brian Kidwell, Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (No. 
A07-584), 2008 WL 7967955. However, his employer relied on all of these cases in its initial brief. See 
Brief and Appendix of Respondent Sybaritic, Inc., Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 
2010) (No. A07-584), 2008 WL 7967961, at ·24-25, ·27. Kidwell's subsequent brief addressed these 
cases as well. Reply Brief of Appellant Brian Kidwell, Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 
(MinD. 2010) (No. A07-584), 2008 WL 7967964, at ·1-2, ·6--7. 
195. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010). 
196. See Erickson v. City of Orr, No. A05-481, 2005 WL 2277395, at·7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 
20,2005); Andrews v. Northwestern Travel Servs., No. C5-97-1766, 1998 WL 100608, at·4 (Minn. C. 
App. Mar. 10, 1998); Gee v. Minn. State Coils. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); 
Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass'n, 404 F. Supp.2d 1127 (D. Minn. 2005). 
197. Kidwell,784N.W.2dat226--27. 
198. The dissent in Kidwell notes that drawing on interpretations of the WPA is inappropriate 
because there are textual distinctions between the two statutes. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d 220, 236 
(Minn. 2010) (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
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exceptions to the job duties exclusion.199 First, the court adopted the 
Huffman exception that protects reports made outside of the normal 
reporting structure,zoo Second, the court adopted the Huffman exception 
that protects reports where the employee is generally required to report 
wrongful behavior (as would be the case where a statute or regulation 
requires the reporting), but the requirement is not a specifically assigned 
dUty.201 
The result of this marriage of existing Minnesota doctrine and the job 
duties exclusion is, at the end of the day, likely to become simply the job 
duties exclusion. This is evident by the manner in which the court 
applied its announced rules. Rather than a general assessment of the 
employee's intent, the court determined that the employee's report was 
not protected because neither of the two Huffman exceptions applied and 
specifically noted that "this case falls within the first situation described 
above in Huffman, where an employee, with a specific assignment for 
ensuring le§al compliance, discovers and reports a potential problem to 
his client." 02 Minnesota has become infected with the job duties 
exclusion.203 Moreover, this marks a significant doctrinal shift because 
the exclusion will now be applied to public and private sector 
employees' whistleblowing claims.204 
The second, and perhaps most enthusiastic, acceptance of the job 
duties exclusion since Garcetti is seen in Haddox v. Ohio Attorney 
General,20s a decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals. Haddox involved 
a state attorney who alleged that she had been demoted because she 
reported a subordinate for misreporting her time, resulting in an accrual 
of com~ensatory time to which the subordinate employee was not 
entitled. 06 The court noted a scarcity of authority interpreting the Ohio 
whistleblowing statute, and therefore turned to Willis and Huffman for 
guidance. The court quoted extensively from Willis and Huffman,207 
199. Id. at 228-29 (majority opinion). 
200. Id at 229-30. 
201. Id 
202. Id. at 230. 
203. Once adopted, the job duties exclusion seems to become a driving force in much 
whistleblowing litigation. For example, since Huffman was decided, the job duties exclusion has been 
relied upon in hundreds of cases involving the WP A. This can be seen by Key Citing Huffman and then 
limiting the display to those cases relying upon the headnotes addressing the job duties exclusion. Since 
these are only the cases that end up being reported by Westlaw, it is fair to assume there are a significant 
number of cases dismissed early on based on the job duties exclusion that do not end up reported. 
204. Kidwell involved a private sector employee. The Minnesota statute covers both public and 
private sector employees. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.931 (West 2010). 
205. Haddox v. Att'y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008). 
206. Id at ·6-7. 
207. The court also mentioned a third case, Anderson v. Dep't of Energy, 89 Fed. App'x 711 
(Fed. eir. 2004) (per curiam), which applied Huffman and cited to Sasse and Skare v. Extendicare 
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then noted that ''we find the reasoning of the federal courts equally 
applicable to [the Ohio statute] .... ,,208 
The Haddox court did not, however, take the initial step of 
considering whether the language of the statutes is sufficiently similar to 
justify following Huffman. In fact, there are differences between the 
statutes. For instance, the WP A does not delineate to whom protected 
disclosures must be made; however, Ohio's statute does by specifically 
identifying supervisors as those to whom reports may be made.2°9 This 
specific inclusion of reports made to supervisors within the protection of 
the statute undercuts part of Huffman'S rationale-that Congress could 
not have intended to cover disclosures to supervisors because that would 
encompass too many workplace disputes. As a matter of statutory 
analysis, Haddox is less than compelling. 
What appeared to be driving the decision in Haddox was the court's 
concern about the potential number of whistleblowing claims that could 
be brought without having a limitation like the job duties exclusion?lO 
As discussed in Part II.A., supra, this concern can be addressed in a far 
more focused manner than by categorically excluding all reports made 
pursuant to one's job. 
Another flaw in the Haddox court's analysis was its second rationale 
for adopting the job duties exclusion. Looking beyond Huffman and its 
progeny, the Haddox court found support for its decision in the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Kidwell v. Sybaritic.2lI The 
problem with this approach, however, is that the Minnesota statute 
contains a good faith requirement that serves as the statutory basis for 
the Kidwell version of the job duties exclusion;212 such a requirement is 
not necessary under the Ohio statute.213 
The third example of adoption of the job duties exclusion is seen in 
the state of Louisiana, and the decision shows a lack of analysis far 
greater than that in Haddox. In Matthews v. Military Dep't of the State 
of Louisiana,214 the Louisiana Court of Appeals determined, without 
Health Servs., Inc., 515 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying Minnesota law in a federal case). 
208. Haddox, 2008 WL 3918077, at ·9. 
209. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006) with OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § I 24.34 I (A) (West 2010). 
Another example of differences between the statutes is that the WPA protects "disclosures", while the 
Ohio statute protects only written ''reports''. While this particular language may not affect the adoption 
of the job duties exclusion, it illustrates how differently the statutes are written, which suggests that 
wholesale adoption in Ohio of a judicially-created exception to the WP A should be viewed skeptically. 
210. See Haddox v. Att'y Gen., No. 07AP-857, 2008 WL 3918077, at·9 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 
2008) (expressing concern that accepting the employee's argument would open the door to every 
supervisory report being the basis for a whistleblowing claim). 
211. Id at 10. 
212. Id 
213. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 124.341(A) (West 2010). 
214. Matthews v. Military Dep't, 970 So. 2d 1089 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
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discussion of the facts or law, that the job duties exclusion applied to a 
whistleblower provision in Louisiana's environmental protection 
statute.21S Rather than relying on Huffman, the court used Sasse to 
support its decision. Even so, since Sasse relied on Huffman as support 
for its adoption of the job duties exclusion, Matthews ultimately rests 
upon Huffman. Much like Haddox, though, the court failed to assess the 
language of the whistleblower protection provision in the Louisiana 
statute and whether the language was sufficiently similar to that in the 
environmental protection statutes at issue in Sasse.2 16 The court's 
summary conclusion in Matthews was followed in a later case, Stone v. 
Entergy Services, Inc.,217 also without any analysis of the rationale for 
adopting the exclusion.218 
As with the Ohio statute, the language of the Louisiana environmental 
protection whistleblower provision is at least somewhat at odds with the 
job duties exclusion. The Louisiana statute explicitly covers reports 
made to an employee's supervisor.219 Neither Matthews nor Stone 
addressed this language. Nor, for that matter, did these decisions 
address any statutory language before reaching the conclusion that the 
job duties exclusion would apply. Similarly, these courts failed to 
discuss the purpose of the Louisiana statute. In fact, the courts failed to 
articulate any rationale whatsoever for adopting the job duties 
exclusion.22o 
The fourth adoption of the job duties exclusion is found in Mize-
Kurzman v. Marin Comm. College District.221 In Mize-Kurzman, the 
trial court gave a limiting jury instruction on a state statutory 
whistleblower claim that incorporated the job duties exclusion in 
HUffman.222 The party's appellate brief indicated that the trial court 
accepted Hu.f.:an, but there was no indication of the rationale behind 
the decision. 23 The case is on appeal, and it remains to be seen whether 
215. Id at 1090. 
216. Id The entire discussion of the job duties exclusion and Sasse consists of the following 
statement: "We also find that plaintiff is afforded no protection under La. R.S. 23:967 or 30:2027 for his 
reports relative to the State's potential liability for acquisition of the Gillis Long Hansen Disease Center 
insofar as the reports were required as part of his nonnal duties. See Sasse v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 409 
F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2005)." Id 
217. Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 9 So. 3d 193 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
218. In Stone, the parties discussed both Matthews and Sasse in their briefs; however, the court's 
opinion states that it finds "no Louisiana cases directly on point" Id at 200. 
219. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027(AXI) (2010). 
220. See generally Stone, 9 So. 3d 193; Matthews v. Military Dep't, 970 So. 2d 1089 (La. Ct. 
App.2007). 
221. Appellant's Opening Brief, Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Comm. Coli. Dist., No. AI26937 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Aug. 10,2010),2010 WL 3481775, at ~O (discussing trial court's decision). 
222. Id 
223. Id 
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the decision will stand. 
Despite these applications of the job duties exclusion, employers have 
not prevailed in every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue. In 
Connecticut, the results for employers have been mixed, with public but 
not private sector employee claims under the Connecticut statute being 
subject to the job duties exclusion. Connecticut presents an interesting 
case study of the influence of Garcetti because the state has a statute 
codifying freedom of speech protections for employees in both 
government and private sector that has been used as the source of 
whistleblower protections by some employees?24 Even though the 
argument for adopting the job duties exclusion seems far more 
compelling under such a statute, courts have, so far, been reluctant to 
apply it to employees in the private sector. For instance, in 2007, a 
Connecticut Superior Court refused to apply Garcett; to a private sector 
employee who brought a claim under the Connecticut statute (§ 31-51q), 
but provided no exrslanation other than the fact that Garcetti involved a 
public employee? 5 A more recent U.S. District Court decision 
provided more substance while reaching the same conclusion. In Trusz, 
the court indicated that Garcett; would not apply, noting that Garcett;'s 
holding applied only to public employees and that it "[did] not follow 
that the rationale for public workplace limitations delineated in Garcetti 
should also apply to private workplaces. ,,226 These cases suggest that 
while Garcetti will not apply to private sector employee claims under 
§ 31-5Iq, it will apply to government employees. 
Since Garcetti, there has been only one case in which the result has 
been a clear repudiation of the job duties exclusion. In Vera v. Sun Land 
Beef CO. 227 the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to adopt the 
employer's argument to apply the job duties exclusion. The case 
involved a former employee of a beef processing company who alleged 
he was fired for reporting to his supervisor incidents where the company 
violated a host of environmental laws?28 The former employee sued, 
based in part on Arizona's whistleblower protection statute. On appeal, 
224. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2010) (providing that "[aJny employer ... who subjects 
any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights 
guaranteed by the [FJirst [AJmendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4, or 14 of article 
first of the Constitution of the state ... shall be liable to such employee for damages .... "). 
Connecticut also has a general whistieblower protection statute which is more similar to the WP A and 
the Minnesota and Texas statutes discussed previously. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (2010). 
225. Lehmann v. Conn. Legal Rights Project, Inc., No. CV054018378, 2007 WL 1053941, at ·1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2007). 
226. Trusz v. USB Realty Investors, L.L.C., No. 309cv268, 2010 WL 1287148, at ·9 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 30, 2010). 
227. Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No.1 CA-CV 07-0479,2009 WL 532625 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 
3,2009). 
228. Id at·1. 
176 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
the employer relied heavily on Gareetli and argued that the Huffman job 
duties exclusion should apply to the Arizona whistleblower protection 
statute.229 In rejecting this contention, the court noted: 
[Defendant] nevertheless contends that Vera's claim should be rejected 
because he merely reported to [Defendant] issues that were public 
knowledge and because he performed his regular employment duties in 
making such warnings. However, these arguments are based on out-of-
state cases and statutes and cannot add to or subtract from the statutory 
provisions set forth by A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii).,,230 
This approach, while not an in-depth analysis of the issue, at least has 
the virtue of considering the state's statutory language. 
In short, before Gareetti was decided, employers sought to apply the 
job duties exclusion in only a handful of cases, and no court adopted it. 
Since Gareetti, however, employers more frequently argue the job 
duties exclusion and with greater success. Six states have directly 
addressed the job duties exclusion. Four of these have adopted it, one 
shows signs of a mixed approach, adopting it for public employees but 
not private sector employees, and only one has refused to adopt it. 
V. FIGHTING THE INFECTION 
Immediate action is required to prevent the job duties exclusion from 
gaining greater acceptance. Three steps can be taken in this effort. 
First, on the federal level, Congress should amend the WP A to overrule 
Willis and Huffman and eliminate the job duties exclusion. The 
necessary amendment is simple, and has been proposed several times in 
the last few years, but it has never been enacted.231 An amendment 
could expand the definition of a protected disclosure by adding the 
following language: "including a disclosure made in the ordinary course 
of an employee's duties. ,,232 Amending the WP A might also have an 
impact beyond the federal employee whistleblower situation, as it would 
discredit Huffman and Willis as a source of support for adopting the job 
duties exclusion. 
Second, at the state level legislatures can proactively amend 
whistleblower protection statutes to explicitly protect job-related 
disclosures. California and the District of Columbia recently became 
229. See Appellant/Cross-Appellee's Opening Brief, Vera v. sun Land Beef Co., No. I CA-CV 
07-0479 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2007), 2007 WL 3047534, at ·2&-27. 
230. Vera v. Sun Land Beef Co., No. I CA-CV 07-0479, 2009 WL 532625, at·3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Mar. 3, 2009). 
231. See S. 274, I 10th Congo (2007); S. 995, 107th Congo (2001). 
232. This is the language that has been proposed by Senator Akaka, an ardent supporter of the 
amendment, on numerous occasions. See S. 274, I 10th Congo (2007); S. 995, 107th Congo (2001). 
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the first jurisdictions to take this step?33 Both of these jurisdictions 
revised the definition of a protected disclosure to explicitly include 
reports made within the course of performing ordinary job duties?34 
While California has taken one proactive step toward ensuring that 
whistleblower protections are not eviscerated by the job duties 
exclusion, not all whistleblowers are covered by this legislative fix. 
California has numerous statutes protecting whistleblowers,235 and only 
one of these, the primary source of protection for state governmental 
employees, has been amended to affirmatively cover disclosures made 
pursuant to one's job duties. Private sector whistleblowers are not 
covered by the amendment. It may be that the legislature believed that 
the job duties exclusion would only apply to public sector employees 
and thus saw no need to amend the private sector whistleblower statutes. 
However, as is evident from Kidwell, the job duties exclusion has been 
applied to statutes that protect private sector employees. More work by 
the legislature is needed to adequately protect California's private sector 
employees. 
In addition to legislative action, courts should be more cautious in 
adopting the job duties exclusion. Courts should consider the precise 
language in state statutes to determine whether the exclusion is 
consistent with the statute. Further, while employers have legitimate 
interests in controlling the workplace, and courts have concerns over 
excessive volume of claims, existing doctrines can be used to address 
these concerns more specifically and narrowly. Foreclosing 
whistleblowing protection to reports made pursuant to one's job and 
within the chain of command without statutory authority for such a 
broad exclusion represents judicial activism with potential to severely 
constrict legitimate reporting of unlawful activity. 
233. See 2009 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 452 (West) (codified at CAL. GoV'T CODE § 8547.2(d»; 2010 
D.C. Laws 18-117, Act 18-265 (201O)(codified at D.C. CODE § 1-615.52(aX6». 
234. See 2009 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 452 (West) (codified at CAL. GoV'T CODE § 8547.2(d); 2010 
D.C. Laws 18-117, Act 18-265 (2010) (codified at D.C. CODE § 1-615.S2(aX6». 
235. For a listing of the most significant statutes providing generalized whistIeblower protections, 
see WESTMAN & MODEsm, supra note 9, at app. A at 281, app. B at 309. 

